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1. Introduction 
 
There has been growing interest in uncertainty in monetary policy-making, and in the 
communication of monetary policy. There are many sides to the problem, starting simply with 
the fact that the future is uncertain. Also central banks in particular (notably the ECB, the 
Bank of England and the US Fed) have sponsored research into model uncertainty.
2
 Attention 
has also been paid to the uncertainty faced by markets to which central banks can contribute 
by erratic or unclear decision making. This has raised the importance of transparency on the 
part of the central bank (e.g. Eusepi, 2005). The main conclusion in the literature is that 
central bank transparency renders „the optimal policy rule robust to expectational mistakes, 
even in the plausible case where the economic agents face other sources of uncertainty about 
the economic environment. On the other end, lack of transparency can lead to a welfare-
reducing outcome where self-fulfilling expectations destabilize the economic system‟ (Eusepi, 
2005, p. 22). Similarly Mishkin (2004) argues that inflation targeting in particular is made 
more effective by transparency. Thus the message is that, whatever the sources of uncertainty, 
the central bank should not add to them. 
 
Yet there have been dissenting voices on the unambiguous benefits of transparency, as 
Geraats (2002) shows in her survey article. Where the central bank is itself uncertain over the 
appropriate action, transparency which communicates that uncertainty could make monetary 
policy less effective. This issue is most relevant where this uncertainty is understood as being 
distinct from quantifiable risk, i.e. as reflecting the need for decision-makers to go beyond 
any one model and exercise judgement (Dow 2003). 
 
A large body of researchhas sought to derive models of optimal monetary policy (e.g. to 
derive optimal Taylor-type rules) in the presence of uncertainty. The majority of the results 
adhere to the Brainard (1967) principle of conservatism or gradualism, that is a central bank 
is unsure about the magnitude and the nature of the economic effect on change in its 
instrument, it should change that instrument less than it would were it sure.
3
 Within a Taylor 
rule context, the theoretical literature
4
 has suggested two ways in which uncertainty should be 
handled: first uncertainly lowers the weights on output gap and inflation but does not have a 
direct effect on the interest rate. Second uncertainty regarding one variable (e.g. inflation) 
                                                 
2
 Uncertainty as to the preferred model on which policy is to be based. 
3
 These results relate to what is known as additive uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty in addition to what is 
known. Where there is uncertainty about parameters in a model, the uncertainty is „multiplicative‟ and 
the conclusion may not be so straightforward. 
4
 see e.g. Peersman and Smets (1999), Walsh (2003) Swanson (2004). 
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should increase the weight put on the other (e.g. output gap).
5
 Using data for the US, Martin 
and Milas (2008) find support for these theoretical predictions. 
 
Matching the work on uncertainty, a new literature has been emerging which takes the issue 
of central bank communication seriously. This literature is based on the view that monetary 
policy consists not just of an interest rate decision and its communication, but also of 
communicating the analysis of the central bank, its expectations, and the confidence with 
which these are held. This wider communication is effected through press conferences and 
published documents, as well as different measures such as the central banks‟ fan charts that 
try to make the concepts and judgements clear. Thus Cobham (2003) and Dow et al. (2009) 
have provided a textual analysis of UK monetary policy committee minutes, while Rosa and 
Verga (2005a, 2005b) have analysed ECB press conference transcripts, to explain how such 
communication is used. 
 
The methodology that we apply in this article builds on Dow et al. (2009) and Rosa and 
Verga (2005a) in particular. We analyze the semantic context of the minutes of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England, the Executive Board (EB) of the Riksbank 
and of the Bank Board (BB) of the Czech National Bank; more specifically we contextualize 
the use of the word „uncertainty‟ so that we can build a glossary to translate the language used 
in the minutes into quantitative variables.
 6
 This allows us to capture the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the meetings. Moreover, the index should capture the weight and the context in 
which the policymakers refer to the concept of uncertainty.  
 
Our analysis allows comparison with previous research on other central banks; by studying 
the language used by central banks with respect to uncertainty in a way where the banks can 
be compared. Hence our aim is twofold: first we aim to derive indicators reflecting the 
uncertainty faced by the policymakers in their considerations.
7
 More specifically, after having 
constructed the uncertainty indexes, we investigate whether they have any particular role in 
the settings of monetary policy. Then, we link the textual analysis to the actual policy 
implementation; we estimate a Taylor rule model in which the coefficients on inflation and 
output gap are functions of our measures and uncertainty. Additionally we explore the 
possibility that the direction of voting can be used as a measure of uncertainty faced by the 
                                                 
5
 There are two exceptions to this rule: the first applies in the case of imperfect or low credibility. The 
second case applies when the there is uncertainty surrounding the degree of inflation persistence. In 
both cases policymakers may find optimal to act more vigorously than it would have been optimal in a 
no-uncertainty scenario.  
6
 These three banks are chosen simply because they offer the longest consistent sets of minutes of the 
inflation targeting central banks, where the votes of the members are also published. 
7
 For the preliminary theoretical foundation see Dow et al. (2005) 
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monetary policy committees. Since the policy decisions are taken collegially it is possible that 
each individual member has his/her own model or even when a single model prevails, the 
uncertainty surrounding it may be subjective to each member.  
 
Hence we test whether this manifestation of uncertainty can explain the settings of the interest 
rate. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section present the context of 
uncertainty in which central banks operate, Section 3 presents the methodology used to 
construct the uncertainty indexes, Section 4 contains the econometric methodology, Section 5 
discusses the results, Section 6 presents a discussion of uncertainty and committee dispersion, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Nature of Uncertainty in monetary policy 
 
Monetary policy operates in conditions of uncertainty about the future and also in terms of a 
potential asymmetry between the knowledge of the monetary authority and market 
participants. Dow et al. (2007, 2009) define three sources of uncertainty; first is global 
uncertainty, which is a consequence of the stochastic nature of the economic environment. 
This also comprises uncertainty about the state of the economy, since there is imperfect 
information derived from the availability of data and the quality of the data themselves; some 
economic indicators are unobservable (e.g. the NAIRU, the potential output and the 
equilibrium rate of interest). Moreover the nature and the persistence of the shock are 
frequently unknown.  
 
The second type of uncertainty is model uncertainty; even in a deterministic world, there is 
the possibility that our limited knowledge would not allow us to reach a single trusted model. 
While it would ease analysis of the problem if somehow the knowledge base of the central 
bank could be represented by a single definable and describable entity, policy decisions are 
usually taken by a committee, whose members have a diverse background, each with their 
own views on how the economy works and what may happen. Even though in a formal 
context central banks may have a formal model that they use in forecasting and explanation, 
 5 
they at the very least augment it with a range of other models, so there can be no exact 
exposition of the opinion forming process.
8
  
 
A third type of uncertainty is signal uncertainty. Monetary policy is conducted not only via a 
change in the short term interest rate, but also through the revalation of the analysis and the 
motivation behind that particular value. This component is, probably, of central importance 
for a successful monetary policy, since the interest rate change itself appears to have little 
impact on future inflation and economic activity. This is largely because, as Svensson (2005) 
highlights, a successful policy maker is able to influence private sector inflation expectations. 
These expectations have a direct impact on the yield curve and on the long-term interest rate, 
which in turn will determine the path of current and future consumption and investment. In 
this framework, central bank communication leaves room for interpretation. Agents therefore 
have to make judgments about the implications, thereby adding uncertainty which may also 
be asymmetric in nature. This could make central bank transparency a two-edged sword. If 
the private sector understands the uncertainty facing the central bank better, this may in turn 
lead to less well anchored inflation expectations in the private sector if it previously thought 
there was less uncertainty. While anchoring expectations on the central bank‟s target is 
beneficial for effective policy, having the anchor through spuriously based certainty is a 
potential threat to future stability and effectiveness of policy should the weakness be realized. 
Something that is most likely to happen when the economy and monetary policy are under 
stress.  
 
Central banks are likely to have better resources to form a view about likely inflation 
developmentsand how they might be influenced than most others in either the public or 
private sectors since this is their primary focus while others have broader concerns. While 
they will have a good understanding of the limitations of their knowledge outsiders will 
neither know what that knowledge is nor the degree of certainty with which it is held. 
However, the ability to communicate is also imperfect and there is hence a clear incentive to 
be clear rather than complete in putting the message across in the event of difficulty. There is 
further interdependence between the monetary authority‟s knowledge, and uncertainty, and 
those of the private sector, in that each forms expectations of what the other is likely to do 
both in the light of their own knowledge and their understanding of the other. As Issing 
(2005) reminds us „data are often not self-explanatory, as their information content changes 
depending on the way they are communicated by the sender‟ (p.67).  
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 Even in cases, such as New Zealand, where a single individual, the Governor, decides, the degree of 
„soft‟ information employed in decision making would make it unrealistic to use a single model to 
represent even the most systematic individual precisely. 
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Moreover since the information provided by the central bank on its decision making process 
is both quantitative and discursive, information uncertainty has both quantifiable and non 
quantifiable aspects. 
 
Although institutionalised procedures ultimately result in specific interest rate decisions, they 
are nevertheless open to different interpretations by market participants. It is this context 
which sets the scene for current debates on the transparency of central bank policies (e.g. 
Geraats 2002). The challenge for a policy committed to transparency consists in ensuring 
adequate transparency of the form and content of decision procedures for revealing the 
collective judgement of the decision-making body as well as sometimes revealing difference 
of opinion.
9
 This form of transparency should make it more likely that market behaviour is 
conditioned by the same expectations as the Central Bank, helping to improve the policy 
makers‟ ability to predict. But it also facilitates a closer anticipation of future decisions if the 
past decision process is well understood and procedures clearly follow a consistent pattern. 
Hence, these signals play a central role in monetary policy. The channels through which these 
signals are formed, are therefore of key importance in the success of the enterprise. 
 
Therefore the central banks under investigation here follow an inflation targeting strategy; 
they all make decisions by committee and publish minutes that reveal internal differences of 
opinion. This comparative study allows some assessment of uncertainty as emerging from the 
minutes and how the voting dispersion shapes monetary policy. 
 
Many central banks including those in this study make a very clear distinction between 
uncertainty and risk, very much along the lines of Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921) namely, 
between sources of variation that can be quantified and those that cannot. The use of fan 
charts typifies the view that it is the distribution of possible outcomes that is more valuable to 
the reader and more realistic for the forecaster – point estimates are always highly likely to be 
wrong and convey only limited information. The distribution of possible outcomes is a 
function of the probability distribution of shocks that can strike the economy over the forecast 
period.
10
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 Geraats (2002) makes it clear that there is a range is aspects over which central banks try to be 
transparent. 
10
 Some central banks have described this more in terms of the distribution of errors that they typically 
make in forecasting and this is of course correct as the processes they use to decide how known and 
unknown events will affect future outcomes are themselves inevitably flawed as even after the event it 
is not possible to observe a pure shock and its outcome. 
 7 
If the central bank had no view at all about the factors that might impinge on the economy 
then fan charts would always be symmetric and risk and uncertainty would be lumped 
together in the probability distribution. In practice, however, there is a list of possible events 
that may occur that are obvious from recent developments. These may relate to policy 
changes for example. In these circumstances the distribution of likely outcomes may no 
longer be simply Normal and hence central banks produce a skewed distribution for forecasts 
depending on the balance of risk.
11
 In these circumstances the usual procedure is simply to 
add a third moment to the forecast distribution in order to describe the skew. This is a highly 
simplified procedure, reflecting the softness of the information and how it can be handled. It 
is, however, noteworthy that in many other circumstances, such as the mainstream finance 
literature, risk is usually described by variance. When central banks discuss risk they are 
normally discussing whether there are grounds for being able to talk about higher moments. 
In the face of crises for example, kurtosis may also enter the discussion, as the chance of a „fat 
tail‟ on the downside increases, although the word itself is not likely to be used in describing 
the problem. 
 
The idea that risk can be quantified and that many forces affecting the economy can be 
translated into a skew is common practice (Britton et al, 1998) even including the ECB, which 
signals the imprecision of point estimates by quoting a range rather than a point estimate. 
Nevertheless in the same way that assuming a Normal distribution measures the likely 
distribution of outcomes, assuming that adding the third moment captures risks is simplistic. 
 
Risks are therefore normally discussed in an explicit section of monetary policy reports and 
may be either explicitly incorporated into the forecast or expressed in terms of scenarios. In 
the former case this represents a judgement on the balance of risks whereas in the latter case it 
is an illustration of the impact of specific alternative set of assumptions that reflect the 
materialisation of a specific risk or set of risks. Uncertainty on the other hand tends to be 
treated much more generally and relates to the confidence with which the various statements 
made in the text can be substantiated. This may relate even to the discussion of risks. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Our basic premise here is that while uncertainty as such is unquantifiable in any 
cardinal way, it is still possible to identify evidence of more or less uncertainty, even 
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 Blix and Sellin (1999) discusses the case where both upside and downside risks may be normally 
distributed but with different variances. Adding such distributions will generate the skew. 
 8 
if such uncertainty can at best be partially ranked in an ordinal sense. This suggests 
broadening the range of economic data to include semantic information as well, and 
recent literature on central bank communication has done just that, by seeking to 
translate discursive information such as minutes of central bank committees and press 
releases into indicators of economic risk and uncertainty. Rosa and Verga (2005a, 
2005b) analysing the ECB President‟s monthly conference, build an index which gives 
„summary statistics of the ECB Governing Council view about both the future prospect of 
inflation and real activity in the Euro area‟. On the most basic level, a simple count of uses of 
the terms „uncertain‟ and „uncertainty‟ can be taken as an ordinal indicator of how much 
uncertainty the central bank was experiencing.  
 
Our focus is on the Bank of England, the Czech National Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank 
language on uncertainty in such a way as to allow some comparison with the previous studies. 
This should shed some light on the implications of the framework differences between the 
monetary authorities for communication about uncertainty, and how that relates to monetary 
policy decisions. Here the committee is treated as a single entity (i.e. voice) rather than a 
collection of individuals and a plurality of voices.  
 
More specifically, we analyse the frequencies of the term „uncertainty‟, studying how they are 
used in the minutes of the monetary policy committees without imposing our own 
interpretations.  Since our focus is on how the MPC communicates its uncertainty we follow 
Dow et al. (2009) and we consider all word forms arising from the word stems „uncertain‟. 
This allows us to derive frequencies f(U) which represent the number of times the respective 
set of expression U is instanced in a given MPC/EB/BB minute in a substantive way that 
reflects their assessment of uncertainty inherent in the given economic situation. To arrive at 
frequency counts that can be regarded as substantive in the sense described, raw counts of U 
occurrences have to be subjected to a preliminary step of analysis that removes instances that 
merely arise as part of a conditional consideration in the minutes. 
 
In each of our three cases we have sought to use the longest available database where 
monetary policy has been subject to the same (inflation targeting) regime. For the Bank of 
England we expand the database of Dow et al. (2009) from January 1999 to December 2007, 
for the CNB our sample starts on January 1999 and for the Riksbank our sample starts on 
February 2000. We have further recorded the length of each minute as a word count, to be 
 9 
able to control for possible change in length during particular months
12
. Lt like U and R 
frequencies, disregards cover page and any annexes.  
 
The derived frequency of uncertainty, f(U), is then classified according the nature of the 
uncertainty described. Here we consider only two different subcategories: references to 
uncertainty on domestic inflation and uncertainty on economic/output activity/growth, which 
are main factors which could be considered to be of relevance when monetary policy 
decisions are taken. Table 1 presents a sample of the sentences that we consider in our 
indices. The data are derived from two independent passes over the minutes. The very few 
remaining disagreements were resolved by a third opinion. 
 
 
4. Empirical specification 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on the well-known Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). It is widely 
accepted that the behaviour of the interest rate can be described by the following policy rule: 
 
 0 *t t t n y t ti a a E a y         (1) 
 
Where 0a  is a constant, ti  is the policy rate at time t, 1t tE   is the expected level of inflation, 
* the targeted level of inflation and ty  is the output gap. Allowing for interest rate 
smoothing, the above equation can be rewritten as: 
 
      0 11 1 *t t t t t t t n y t ti a i a E a y               (2) 
 
Following the theoretical literature and Martin and Milas (2008) we know that the parameters, 
a  and ya  are functions of uncertainty underlining the model and the state of the economy so 
that in presence of uncertainty the above equation can be rewritten as: 
 
       0 1 *unc unc unct t t t t t t t n y y t t ti a u i a a u E a a u y                  (3) 
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 For more details on the Bank of England see Dow et al.(2009). 
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Where  1 unct t tu      and tu is the measure of uncertainty described in the previous 
section. 
This method allows us to test whether the response to uncertainty as communicated in the 
central bank minutes is reflected in the behaviour of the policy makers that is whether in 
presence of uncertainty the interest rate settings adheres to the Brainard‟s principle. If the 
predictions of the theoretical literature are correct then we should expect 
unca  and 
unc
ya to take 
a value smaller than zero. On the other hand, 
unc
t  is expected to be positive since central 
bank may respond cautiously to uncertainty surrounding the data. 
13
 
 
Our second empirical specification considers the two sub-sets of uncertainty: inflation 
uncertainty and output uncertainty. Our second specification is therefore given by: 
 
    1 0 1 21 *t t t t t t n t ti i a E y               (4) 
 
Where  , ,1 unc y unc yt ta a u a u        and  , ,2 unc y unc yy y t y ta a u a u      
Here 
tu

 and 
y
tu  are inflation and output uncertainty, respectively. As state previously, the 
literature makes clear prediction of how an optimal policy should be set. If increased 
uncertainty leads to a more passive response to a variable and strengthen the response to the 
other we should expect 
, 0unca   and 
, 0y unca   on the inflation side, while 
, 0uncya
   and 
, 0y uncya   on the output.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
In Table 2 through 4 we report the estimates for the various Taylor rule specifications. 
The sample period goes from 1999:1 to 2007:1 for the UK and the Czech Republic, 
while the sample starts in 2000 for Sweden. We use this sample period since we 
wanted to exclude from our analysis, the financial crisis, when monetary authorities 
were mainly focused on restoring financial stability and preventing the collapse of the 
financial system, rather than focusing on the more traditional objectives of inflation 
and output stabilization. For the interest rate we use the end of the month official bank 
rate, the forecasts of inflation are from the Bank of England Inflation Attitudes Survey, 
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 Orphanides (2008). 
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from the CNB survery of Inflation expectations of households and the Economic Tendency 
Survey compiled by the National Institute of Economic Research for Sweden.
14
 The output 
gap is measured using the industrial production data detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.  
In column 1 of each table we report the estimates of traditional Taylor rules obtained from the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. 
 
The estimates indicate that interest rates increase by more than two percentage points in 
response to a one percentage increase of point excess of inflation over the inflation target. The 
response to the output gap varies across our sample; we obtain a value of 0.931 as a response 
to a one percentage point excess of output over equilibrium output in Sweden against the 1.8 
in the United Kingdom and a statistically insignificant response by the Czech National Bank.  
The intercept is statistically significant in all three cases and it is very close to the interest rate 
average for the sample period. The parameter t  indicates that the interest rate is highly 
persistent, this is not surprising given the monthly series of the series and that central banks 
tend to adjust interest rate during months when the inflation report is published, which is 
when new information is available.
15
 
 
Column (i) show the estimates of Taylor rules where all the parameters are allowed to be 
function of our measure of uncertainty. We find that uncertainty does not affect the interest 
rate smoothing parameter, 
unc
t . Hence we re-estimate the model setting 0
unc
t  . 
 
The results using a single measure of uncertainty are not promising. The inclusion of 
measures of uncertainty does not support the prediction of the Brainard‟s principle. The 
estimates of the parameters of interest (
unca , 
unc
ya ) are of the opposite sign or not statistically 
different from zero. The reason for this could be twofold, either there is no valuable 
information about the uncertainty surrounding the policy decisions of the monetary policy 
committees or this measure of uncertainty is too general and hides the uncertainties which 
have a direct impact on the members of the policy committee. Hence, these results do not 
shed any light on which „type‟ of uncertainty matters. The theoretical literature suggests that 
in the presence of uncertainty an optimal monetary policy should respond by decreasing the 
weight put on inflation when this indicator is uncertain, but it should increase the weight on 
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 With the expectation of Sweden where the forecast is available monthly, the quarterly observations 
are interpolated to obtain monthly series, as in Beasly et al. (2008). 
15
 On this point see Cobham (2003). 
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the other variables (in our case the output gap). To test this hypothesis we use our measure of 
inflation and output uncertainty. Results are presented in columns (iii).  
 
The estimated coefficients of inflation and output uncertainty indicates that the response of 
interest rates to inflation is weaker when inflation is more uncertain and stronger when the 
output gap is more uncertain (although this latter effect is not statistically significant for 
Riksbank and the CNB). For the Bank of England we also find that the response to changes in 
output gap is affected by the two types of uncertainty, while for the Riksbank only inflation 
uncertainty is statistically significant.  
 
As for inflation expectations, at the time monetary policy decisions are taken there is a high 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the output gap. To correct for this well known problem we 
use estimates of real time data for the output gap for Sweden and the UK as provided by the 
OECD output gap revisions database.
16
 The results presented in tables 6 and 7 seem to 
provide some support to the Brainard principle. The smaller response to inflation when 
inflation is less certain, while the larger response to inflation when output is less certain is 
consistent with the predictions of Peersman and Smets (1999) and Swanson (2004). 
 
 
6. Voting dispersion as a measure of uncertainty 
 
In this section we explore the link between the uncertainty as measured by the voting 
dispersion in the policy committees and the changes in the interest rate. 
 
The rationality underlying a possible link between actual policy decisions and how 
members vote rests on the observation that policy committees are composed of 
members with different background. Recently a part of the literature has extensively 
investigated the implication of this diversity, suggesting the existence of heterogeneity 
across committee members with respect to information and preferences. For instance, 
studying the Bank of England, Gerlach-Kristen (2009) shows the existence of 
differences between internal and external members. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008) 
and Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) estimate individuals‟ Taylor rules; they suggest 
that long-run responses to the inflation gap are fairly homogenous, but individual 
characteristics are responsible for the heterogeneity in the MPC voting patterns. 
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 Data for the CNB are not available. The data are available at a quarterly frequency; hence the 
observations are interpolated to obtain monthly series. 
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In this context, it is reasonable to assume that “each member of the monetary policy 
committee holds a particular view of the behaviour of the economy represented by a 
macro model” and with it comes a level of confidence or uncertainty, Levin and 
Williams (2003, p.946). Even if there is a single trusted model shared across the 
members, it is plausible that each member would attach an individual degree of 
uncertainty.  
 
If this is the case, then each member‟s vote would adhere to the Brainard‟s principle 
of conservatism, and as a whole a high level of committee uncertainty would be 
reflected in a high level of voting dispersion.  
 
We measure voting dispersion as: 
 
 
 
    
 
      1
total number of votes majority votes
Voting dispersion
number required for a majority



 
 
so that the variable runs from zero for full agreement to unity for the maximum level 
of disagreement possible. 
 
In table 6 we re-estimate the model replacing the uncertainty measure with the level 
of voting dispersion. For all three central banks, there is no evidence that the voting 
dispersion has an impact on the interest rate smoothing; this is in accordance with the 
estimates obtained from our derived measure of uncertainty. 
Looking first at the results from the CNB we notice that the estimates are very close 
to the one of the Taylor rule with no uncertainty, but there is no evidence that voting 
dispersion had any impact on the interest rate. Moving to the Riksbank, the results 
suggests that uncertainty as measured by the voting dispersion has no impact on the 
response of interest rate to inflation deviations from the target and the output gap. For 
the Bank of England estimates of uncertainty are statistically significant, at the usual 
level of confidence, but only the uncertainty surrounding inflation has the expected 
sign. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have derived three measures of uncertainty using the minutes of the 
committees of the Bank of England, the Czech National Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank.  
We estimated the impact of uncertainty on monetary policy using the traditional Taylor rule 
framework. The foundation of this work rested on the theoretical literature which suggests 
that in the presence of uncertainty central bankers should lower the weights on output gap and  
on inflation but does not have a direct effect on the interest rate.  
 
We have found some evidence that monetary policy has been affected by uncertainty and that 
these effects are generally consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature. The 
predictions made by the literature are verified for the Riksbank and partly satisfied in the 
estimations of the Bank of England interest rate. However we find no role for uncertainty in 
the CNB. We find it difficult to believe that uncertainty has no place in the CNB committee, 
we can only conjecture that this lack of evidence rests on how the minutes are written. 
 
Our work can be extended in a number of ways. This framework can be applied to other 
countries in order to test whether there is a clear pattern in the response of monetary policy to 
uncertainty and whether banks following an inflation targeting strategy behave differently 
from those that adopt other strategies. It would also be of interest to analyse the impact of 
financial market uncertainty and investigate if asset price uncertainty has had any impact on 
the monetary policy. Finally, there are manay more sophisticated forms of textual analysis 
that can be used. 
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Appendix I 
 
Table 1: Sample of inflation uncertainty and output uncertainty 
 Inflation Uncertainty  Ouput uncertainty 
Bank of England The overall effect of the exchange 
rate depreciation on inflation was 
highly uncertain, especially if 
overseas exporters‟ margins to the 
UK fell more sharply than 
previously expected and if retail 
margins were squeezed further. 
(June 2000) 
Second, there was uncertainty 
about the estimate for GDP for 
the first quarter. (June 2002) 
 The short-term outlook for CPI 
inflation was particularly 
uncertain: it was unclear how 
much of the recent rise in energy 
prices had yet to pass through the 
supply chain […] (November 
2005) 
Overall, the near-term outlook for 
output growth had probably 
softened, but the extent of this 
was uncertain. (October 2004) 
Czech National 
Bank 
In contrast, the future 
development of demand inflation 
would be affected by strong 
uncertainties (downward in 
nature) relating especially to 
investment dynamics (February 
2001) 
Uncertainty concerning the 
intensity of future economic 
recovery […] (March 2000) 
 The quantification and timing of 
these price effects constituted an 
important uncertainty surrounding 
the inflation forecast (September 
2002) 
It was also said that the revision 
of the national accounts, which is 
currently under way could 
increase the uncertainty regarding 
the past and present development 
of GDP and the output gap (June 
2004) 
Riksbank The situation has changed a good 
deal since the spring, when a 
positive interest rate differential 
with the European Central Bank's 
rate was motivated by Sweden's 
more expansionary fiscal policy, a 
weak exchange rate and 
uncertainty about the path of 
domestic inflation. (October 
2002) 
The Executive Board concluded 
that economic developments 
continue to be marked by the 
great uncertainty regarding the 
Iraq crisis, the uncertainty 
regarding the strength of 
international economic activity 
and increased savings resulting 
from households' and companies' 
balance sheets adjustments after 
the fall in share prices (February 
2003) 
  There was considerable 
uncertainty over how lasting the 
effects on inflation would be 
(March 2005) 
 The information received since 
then had also to some extent 
dispersed uncertainty over 
economic activity in Sweden and 
abroad, and the assessment was 
that inflation would rise when 
capacity utilisation increased. 
(December 2005) 
Notes: Date in parenthesis refers to the month the sentence appeared to.
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Table 2: Taylor rule estimates – Sweden 
 Taylor rule Taylor rule with uncertainty 
  (i) (iii) (iii) 
0a  2.934 *** 3.018 *** 
2.781 *** 1.995 *** 
t  0.901 *** 0.880 *** 
0.872 *** 0.970 *** 
unc
t   -0.000 
  
a  2.025 *** 2.372 *** 
2.776 *** 2.903 *** 
unca   -0.000 
0.000  
,unca    
 -0.111 *** 
,y unca    
 0.002 *** 
ya  0.795 *** 1.717 *** 
  1.549 *** 1.509 *** 
unc
ya   0.001 
0.001 **  
,y unc
ya    
 -0.015 *** 
,unc
ya

    -0.001 
     
J-stats 15.40 (p = 0.65) 5.79 (p = 0.44) 4.62 (p = 0.70) 4.41(p = 0.90) 
     
Notes: The weight matrix is Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent. Standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at 
10, 5 and 1 level. J-stats refers to the Hansen's J statistics. 
 
 
Table 3: Taylor rule estimates – UK 
 Taylor rule Taylor rule with uncertainty 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
0a  4.128 *** 4.229 *** 4.209 *** 4.913 *** 
t  0.964 *** 0. 944 *** 0.944 *** 0.932 *** 
unc
t   -0.000   
a  2.955 *** 1.812*** 1.840 *** 2.147 *** 
unca   -0.006 0.007  
,unca     -0.020 ** 
,y unca     0.177 ** 
ya  1.880 *** 0.728 ** 0 .729 *** 0.176 *** 
unc
ya   -0.013 ** -0.013 ***  
,y unc
ya     0 .013 *** 
,unc
ya

    -0.035 *** 
     
J-stats 21.44 (0.123) 5.65 (p = 0.91) 5.649 (p = 0.90) 6.70(p = 0.80) 
     
Notes: The weight matrix is Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent. Standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5 
and 1 level. J-stats refers to the Hansen's J statistics. 
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Table 4: Taylor rule estimates – Czech Rebublic 
 Taylor rule Taylor rule with uncertainty 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
0a  3.382 *** 2.706 *** 2.823 *** 4.491 *** 
t  0.960 *** 0.958 *** 0.956 *** .961 *** 
unc
t   0.000   
a  2.851 *** 3.538 ** 3.780 *** 3.565 * 
unca   0.078 * 0.090 ***  
,unca     -0.019 *** 
,y unca     0 .027  
ya  -0.109  -0.450 -0.636 * -0.425 
unc
ya   -0.006 -0.019 *  
,y unc
ya     0.034 
,unc
ya

    -0.005 
     
J-stats 1.45 (p = 0.92) 5.47 (p = 0.90) 4.78 (p = 0.68) 6.43 (p = 0.59) 
     
Notes: The weight matrix is Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent. Standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5 
and 1 level. J-stats refers to the Hansen's J statistics. 
 
 
Table 5: Taylor rule estimates with voting dispersion 
 
 Riksbank Bank of England  Czech National Bank 
0a  
3.285 *** 5.318 *** 3.138 *** 
t  
0.956 *** 0.965 *** 0.971 *** 
unc
t  
-0.007 -0.0002 *** 0. .000  
a  
2.823 *** 2.210 *** 2.474 *** 
unca  
-0.174 *** -0.018 *** -0.012 
ya  
0.445 *** 2.878 *** -0.613  
unc
ya  
-0.034 *** 0.026 *** -0.028  
    
J-stats 13.13 (p = 0.78) 5.34 (p = 0.92) 5.45 (p = 0.85) 
    
Notes: The weight matrix is Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent. Standard errors robust 
to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 level. J-stats 
refers to the Hansen's J statistics. 
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Appendix II 
 
Table 6: Taylor rule estimates with real time data - Sweden 
 Taylor rule Taylor rule with uncertainty 
  (i) (iii) (iii) 
0a  2.934 *** 3.018 *** 
2.781 *** 1.995 *** 
t  0.901 *** 0.880 *** 
0.872 *** 0.924 *** 
unc
t   -0.000 
  
a  2.025 *** 2.372 *** 
2.776 *** 2.903 *** 
unca   -0.000 
0.000  
,unca    
 -0.111 *** 
,y unca    
 0.002 *** 
ya    
  
unc
ya  0.795 *** 1.717 *** 
  1.549 *** 1.509 *** 
,y unc
ya   0.001 
0.001 ** -0.015 *** 
,unc
ya

    -0.001 
     
J-stats 15.40 (p = 0.65) 5.79 (p = 0.44) 4.62 (p = 0.70) 4.41(p = 0.98) 
     
Notes: The weight matrix is Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent. Standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at 
10, 5 and 1 level. J-stats refers to the Hansen's J statistics. 
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Table 7: Taylor rule estimates with real time data – UK  
 Taylor rule Taylor rule with uncertainty 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
0a  4.451 *** 4.124 *** 4.456 *** 4.962 *** 
t  0.923 *** 0.921 *** 0.936 *** 0.899 *** 
unc
t   0.000   
a  1.546 *** 2.064 ** 3.205 ** 1.381 *** 
unca   0.018 0.014  
,unca     -0.005 
,y unca     0. 167 *** 
ya  1.216 *** 0.126 -5.151 0.813 *** 
unc
ya   -0.024 * -0.146  
,y unc
ya     -0.094 *** 
,unc
ya

    0.011 
     
J-stats 15.76 (p = 0.20) 4.41 (p = 0.98) 1.94 (p =0.99) 4.36 (p = 0.82) 
     
Notes: The weight matrix is Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent. Standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at 
10, 5 and 1 level. J-stats refers to the Hansen's J statistics. 
 
 
